

Example similar to
Prisoners Dilemma:

Market:

2 competing Firms

- set high price (H)
- set low price (L)

if both set a high price, both get a profit or utility of 500 each.

if both set low (L) price, then both get a lower payoff of 250 each.

if one firm sets high (H) while other sets a low (L) price, Firm which sets a high price gets 0 while firm with low price gets 750 since it captures the entire market.

Game Table:

$F_1 \backslash F_2$	H	L
H	500, 500	0, 750
L	750, 0	250, 250

Best Responses Intersect

Nash Equilibrium

$$BR_1(H) = L$$

$$BR_1(L) = L$$

$$BR_2(H) = L$$

$$BR_2(L) = L$$

$$BR_1(L) = L$$

$$BR_2(L) = L$$

At outcome (L, L) each firm is playing its Best Response.

Therefore (L, L) is the
'Nash equilibrium' outcome.

Setting low prices is indeed
a Nash Equilibrium!

'Nash-Equilibrium' is a
'Self Enforcing' agreement

'Price-war'

$F_1 \backslash F_2$	H	L
H	500, 500	0, 750
L	750, 0	250, 250

L,L is the only 'self enforcing' agreement.

$F_1 \backslash F_2$	H	L
H	500, 500	0, 750
L	750, 0	250, 250

... NOT 'Pareto Optimal'.

Given any outcome, if there is NO other outcome such that both players can **SIMULTANEOUSLY** improve their payoff, it is known as a **PARETO** optimal outcome.

(H,H) — Pareto Optimal
(H,L) — Pareto Optimal
(L,H) — Pareto Optimal
(L,L) — NOT Pareto Optimal.