

Intentionality

John Searle

What is Intentionality?

- **Feature of consciousness/ property of consciousness**
- **Directedness/ aboutness/ of-ness**
- **Belief, Desire, intention, etc.**

Intentionality & Experience

- Rohan **desires** to have a high profile job
- Rohan **believes** that high profile job are available in the market and he **intends** to work hard.
- Rohan's desire will be **fulfilled** *iff* he works hard and secures good grade in the final exam.

II Directedness

- Teacher says that
- Rohan is doing well in the calss
- Rohan is happy about his performance in the class and exam.

- Rohan gets good grade and the high profiled job.

III. unintentional states

- Rohan says that he is **feeling** sad.
- Rohan **does not know why** this sadness.
- Is Rohan **dipressed**?
- Is he **anxious** of getting a well-paid job?

- Evidence of **Undirected** mental states

Thought and Action

- Intending and intention are just one form of intentionality (1983: 3)
- Intending is an intentional act
- **Doing (drinking/ writing)**
- **Desiring or expecting (mental act)**

Intentionality and Representation

- Intentional state (directed) object/ SAF
- Speech act (represent) object/ SAF in the world

- Intentional states are representational states

- Is intentionality necessarily linguistic?

Intentional expression

- Our bay daughter often cries for food
- Ladoo my friend's pet keeps waiting till my friend arrives
- Language/ meaning is derived from intentionality not conversely.

Speech as expression

- Speech act: Illocutionary force
- **F(P)**
- **Representative content** → **Direction of Fit**
- **Psychological Mode** → **Condition of Satisfaction**
- **Pm(Rc)**

Direction of fit

– **Assertives:**

RCP is there in the class.

– i) **Mind → to → the world**

– li) **World → to → the mind**

R

Condition of satisfaction

- Illocutionary act and intentional sincerity
- **Internal**
- Saying and Meaning must go together

Concept of Representation

- Cognitive Science and AI
- “I am most emphatically not saying that a belief is a kind of picture, not am I endorsing Tractatus account of meaning nor I am saying that belief re-presents something.” (1983: 9)

Searle on Representations

- Not syntactical
- Syntax will be causally determined
- Syntax in the computational process is observer relative
- For Searle, MR are related to feeling, experience, understanding, etc.

Content

- Content is revealed in different modes of intentionality working together.
- Perception: seeing, experiencing, believing, hoping,
- Understanding and imagination are higher order consciousness.

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